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RECENT DECISIONS
In the absence of special contract, the extent of damages is the
difference between the market value of the shipment at destination
in the condition in which tendered to the consignee and the condi-
tion in which it was delivered to the carrier, the damaged portions
being disposed of in accordance with the usage and custom of the
trade.7  Consignee must accept the damaged goods and take all rea-
sonable steps to minimize damages, unless the shipment is so dam-
aged as to be valueless. Consignee-plaintiff is then entitled to be put
in as good a position as he would have been had the defendant carrier
delivered the shipment uninjured, regard being had in applying the
measure of damages to the use and the purpose for which the ship-
ment was intended.8
In the instant case, the plaintiff having met both the require-
ments of "condition" and "damages", the judgment was correctly
rendered.
W. D. D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEcr AND INDIRECT EFFECT UPON
COMMERCE-DuE PRocEss.-Respondent corporation is one of the
largest manufacturers of steel in America. It receives most of its raw
materials from, and ships seventy-five per cent of its products to states
other than Pennsylvania in which it has its principal mills. It em-
ploys more than a half million men. Respondent discharged nine men,
allegedly for engaging in union activities. All of the discharged men
were engaged in manufacturing in the respondent's Pennsylvania
mills. The discharged men appealed to the National Labor Relations
Board which found the respondent had violated the National Labor
Relations Act 1 by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce. The Board ordered the respondent to offer reinstatement to
the discharged men and to make good their losses in pay. Upon failure
of the corporation to comply, the Board petitioned the Circuit Court
of Appeals to enforce the order. The Court denied the petition hold-
ing the Act unconstitutional in so far as it affects manufacturing or
"10 CoRPUS JURis 395, § 606; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. McCaull-
Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (1920) ; Kilthau v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., 245 N. Y. 361, 157 N. E. 267 (1927) ; King v. Sherwood,
22 App. Div. 548, 48 N. Y. Supp. .34 (2d Dept. 1897) ; Porter v. Penna. R. M,
217 App. Div. 49, 215 N. Y. Supp. 727 (7th Dept. 1926); Perkel v. Penna.
R. R., 148 Misc. 284, 265 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1933); Crinella v. Northwestern
Pac. R. R., 85 Cal. App. 440, 259 Pac. 774 (1927).
' Perkel v. Penna. R. R., 148 Misc. 284, 265 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1933).
'Act of July 5, 1935, 49 STAT. at L. 449, c. 372, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1935);(1936) 10 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 359 (discussion of provisions of bill). Labor is
guaranteed the right to organize, and employers are forbidden to interfere with
labor's rights. Such interference is termed an unfair labor practice.
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any other intrastate business. 2  On appeal to the Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The Act is valid in its entirety; Congress may
regulate intrastate practices which directly burden commerce; and
labor relations may be one of these practices. National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 300 U. S. -, 57 Sup. Ct.
619 (1937).
The Wagner Act declares that interference by employers with
labor's right to organize, causes strikes which seriously affect inter-
state commerce. Such interference therefore becomes the proper
province of Congress.3 Legislation enacted under the commerce
clause must conform to due process. 4 An act is lacking in due process
when it is unreasonable or arbitrary,5 or when considered as a means,
the measure has no real or substantial relation of cause to a permis-
sible end. 6 The court's finding that the Act is not lacking in due
process and that freedom of contract is not infringed,7 shows a direct
reversal from the attitude of the court in Adair v. U. S.,8 which case
decided that a law which forbids an employer from discharging any
employee because of membership in a union is violative of the Fifth
Amendment.
There is much in the preamble of the Act and in congressional
discussions on the bill to give rise to an inference that Congress had
as a primary concern, not regulation of commerce but, control of labor-
283 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
' U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, par. 3: "Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce * * * among the various states * * *." The power to regulate com-
merce is the power to restrain, foster, protect and control.
" U. S. CONsT. Art. V: "*** * nor (shall any person) be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Liberty includes freedom of
action. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) § 234;
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct. 854
(1935).
'Interstate C. C. v. P. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108 (1912).
JACOBSON, DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, p. 539.
1 The courts have long recognized the right of labor to organize. American
Steel v. Tri City, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921). Legislation which
restates the rights of labor and compels employers to recognize those rights
cannot be termed arbitrary or unreasonable. The measure seeks to remove
strikes from obstructing commerce by removing the cause of strikes; the
intimate relation of cause to the end is likewise present.
"Any legislation which compels an employer to negotiate with one with
whom he would not otherwise deal, does infringe upon the employer's freedom
of contract (as developed in the Adair case). Here was an oppor-
tunity for the Court, with the case of the West Coast Hotel fresh in mind,
to say that there was here an infringement upon individual liberty but "the
constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrolable liberty. The
liberty safeguarded being liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of laws against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals,
and welfare of the people." The Court, however, in some manner arrived at
the conclusion that "a provision that employers must treat with labor's repre-
sentatives does not abridge freedom of contract * *
'208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
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relations; 9 but a consideration of the effective provisions of the bill
shows nothing but the desire of Congress to remove an obstacle to
the free flow of commerce. 10 Where the Act upon its face is what it
purports to be the court is "not at liberty to inquire into the motives
of the legislature." 11
The court rests its decision that the Act is constitutional upon the
settled rule that Congress may regulate practices which, although local
in character, directly burden or hinder interstate commerce. 12 It is
submitted, that the finding that labor relations of an intrastate em-
ployer can directly affect commerce will set at naught the dicta 13 of
the Schechter case 14 and that part of the Carter decision 15 which
attempted to set up as the test of federal control of local practice-
not whether commerce is affected unduly '6 but rather whether com-
merce is affected proximately.17 The court in the instant case defi-
IU. S. CoNST. Art. X: "The Powers not delegated to the Federal Govern-
ment by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the
states respectively * * *."
2"The grant of authority *** does not purport to extend to the relation-
ship between all industrial employees and employers. It purports to reach only
what may be deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce ** ". Instant case,
p. 621.
"Ex porte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 1868); WILOUGHBY, ON THE
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1929) § 20.
"Chicago Board v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923) ; Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922).
"The case had already been disposed of by the holding that the N.I.R.A.
represented an unauthorized delegation of legislative power. Corwin, The
Schechter Case-Landinuark, or What? (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 155, 162.
"'Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935);
10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 119 (discussion) ; Corwin, The Schechter Case-Land-
mark, or What? (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 155.
"Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936) ; (1936)
11 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 107.
" The effect upon commerce was the test prior to the Schechter and Carter
cases. Chicago Board v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923) ; "What
the cases mean (when they use the word direct) is that the causal relation in
such circumstances is so close and intimate and obvious as to permit it to be
called direct without subjecting the word to an unfair over-excessive strain."
Dissenting opinion, Carter v. Carter, 298 U. S. 238, 56"Sup. Ct. 855, 880 (1936).
In other words the local practice need not proximately affect interstate com-
merce. It was enough to bring it under federal control that the practice, even
though through some intermediary to which it gave existence, burdened com-
merce. It is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury which is
the criterion; Texas R. F. v. Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 570, 50 Sup. Ct. 427
(1929) ; Corwin, The Schechter Case-Landmark, or What? (1936) 13 N. Y.
U. L. Q. R. 168; BRANT, STORMa OVER THE CONSTITUTION (1936) 144.
" The word "direct" implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed
shall operate proximately-not mediately, remotely or collaterally-to produce
the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or con-
dition. And the extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its character.
The distinction between direct and indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude
of either the cause or effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has
been brought about. Instant case, p. 638, dissenting opinion quoting Carter
case.
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nitely refuses to concern itself with proximity of cause. It says, "The
question remains as to the effect upon interstate commerce of the labor
practices involved; * * * the fact remains that the stoppage of those
(respondents) operations by industrial strife would have a most seri-
ous effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondents' far flung
activities, it is idle to say the effect would be indirect or remote." 18
B. B.
CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION-"'BANK NIGHITS"-PRoMISSORY
ESTOPPEL.-The defendant, in course of operating its theatre, held
what is commonly termed a "Bank Night".' Patrons of the theatre,
among whom was the plaintiff, were requested to enter their names
and addresses next to numbers in a book provided by the defendant,
who advertised publicly that the person whose number was drawn on
a certain night would be awarded a money prize. Plaintiff alleges
that he has done all the defendant had requested, that he was present
when his number was drawn, and that the defendant has refused pay-
ment of the prize money. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action on two grounds: (1) Lack of
consideration for promise to pay prize money; (2) the contract, if
the court finds consideration, is illegal and void as a lottery. Held,
motion to dismiss complaint denied. The plaintiff furnished adequate
consideration and according to a decision affirmed by the Court of
Appeals certain "Bank Night" schemes are not lotteries,2 and, there-
fore, are legal.3 Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc.
491, 293 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1937).
Consideration need not be tangible property capable of delivery,
nor need it have monetary value,4 but it may consist in the promisee's
performance of something he was not already legally bound to do.'
The plaintiff furnished adequate consideration for the defendant's
'The Court seems to avoid the use of the word "direct" or "indirect";
it speaks of "the close and intimate effect," p. 625, "the close and intimate
relation," p. 624.
1 (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 877.IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1370: "A lottery is a scheme for the distribution of
property by chance among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable
consideration for the chance, whether called a lottery, raffle, or gift, enterprise
or some other name".
'People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 694, aff'd, 273 N. Y.
475, 6 N. E. (2d) 410 (1936).
'ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Turck ed. 1929) 63.
'13 CORPUS JuRis 324; POLLOCK, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1888) 166; 1 WILLis-
TON, CONTRACrS (1st ed. 1934) § 102a; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 95 Me. 17, 49 Atl.
49; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q. B. 256 (1893).
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